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Abstract 
 
In 1973 Haddon proposed ten strategies for reducing and avoiding damages 
based on a model of potential harmful energy transfer (Haddon, 1973). The 
strategies apply to a large variety of unwanted phenomena. Haddon’s pioneering 
work on countermeasures has had a major influence on later thinking about 
safety. Considering its impact it is remarkable that the literature offers almost no 
discussions related to the theoretical foundations of Haddon’s countermeasure 
strategies. The present report addresses a number of theoretical issues related 
to Haddon’s countermeasure strategies, which are:  
 
• A reformulation and formalization of Haddon’s countermeasure strategies  
• An identification and description of some of the problems associated with 
the term “barrier”  
• Suggestions for a more precise terminology based on the causal structure 
of countermeasures  
• Extending the scope of countermeasures to include sign-based counter-
measures 
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Introduction  
 
In 1973 Haddon proposed ten strategies for reducing and avoiding damages based on a 
model of potential harmful energy transfer (Haddon, 1973). The strategies apply to a 
large variety of unwanted phenomena. Haddon’s pioneering work on countermeasures 
has had a major influence on later thinking about safety. Considering its impact it is 
remarkable that the literature offers almost no discussions related to the theoretical 
foundations of Haddon’s countermeasure strategies. The present report addresses a 
number of theoretical issues related to Haddon’s countermeasure strategies, which are: 
 
• A reformulation and formalization of Haddon’s countermeasure strategies 
• An identification and description of some of the problems associated with the 
term “barrier” 
• Suggestions for a more precise terminology based on the causal structure of 
countermeasures 
• Extending the scope of countermeasures to include sign-based countermeasures 
 
In the report a means-end view of countermeasures is adopted. A countermeasure is an 
action that serves as a means of opposing some unwanted phenomena, whereas the 
entities participating in a countermeasure are considered as means of the countermeasure.  
 
A formalization of Haddon’s countermeasure strategies is proposed based on a model of 
causation that generalizes Haddon’s energy transfer model (representing some unwanted 
phenomena). The chosen model gives primacy to causal action and the role of the 
underlying entities participating in action (e.g. agent and patient). By means of adopting a 
negative perspective on the determinants of causal action a set of generic 
countermeasures is derived. Preliminary results can be found in (Lind and Petersen, 
2003).  
 
The proposed formalization of Haddon’s strategies throws new light on the theoretical 
foundation of countermeasure strategies. Furthermore, it widens the field of application 
to areas where the countermeasures based on an energy transfer model require too much 
forcing. The latter has been the primary motivation for the generalization of the MORT 
barrier analysis (see e.g. (Kingston, 2002) and (Kingston et al., 2004)).  
 
The term “barrier” is widely used for the analysis and assessment in safety critical 
domains, such as nuclear power plants (e.g. (Svenson, 1991)). Despite its widespread use, 
the term “barrier” is somewhat problematic and in the safety literature its specific 
meaning lacks consensus. The present report outlines some of the problems associated 
with the term “barrier” and attempts to clarify its use based on an analysis of the causal 
structure of countermeasures, i.e. the relationship between a specific countermeasure and 
the participating entities.  
 
In the model of causation the causal agent has no decision-making capabilities. Clearly 
this is a limitation if we want to consider the countermeasures for actions performed by 
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humans. Accordingly a revised model is proposed where the causal agent is substituted 
by an intelligent agent.  
 
In order to account for countermeasures of unwanted actions performed by intelligent 
agents it is necessary to extend the scope of countermeasures from physical actions to 
communicative actions, i.e. actions based on signs produced in order to influence the 
action of the agent interpreting them. The producer and the interpreter of the sign may be 
separated in space and time. A procedure, for example, is a sign produced in order to 
make an intelligent agent act in a specific way.  
 
The present report discusses the means-end levels of communicative action based on 
Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962)(Searle, 1969). A set of sign-based countermeasure 
types, that complements the causal countermeasure types, is proposed. 
 
 
Haddon’s countermeasure strategies 
 
Haddon´s ten generic countermeasure strategies are outlined in Table 1. The strategies 
represent a generalization of accident countermeasures based on experience from a large 
variety of domains.  
 
Haddon’s Countermeasure Strategies 
1. To prevent the initial marshalling of the form of energy 
2. To reduce the amount of energy marshalled 
3. To prevent the release of the energy 
4. To modify the rate of spatial distribution of release of energy 
from its source 
5. To separate in space or time the energy being released from the 
susceptible structure 
6. To separate the energy being released from the susceptible 
structure by interposition of a material barrier 
7. To modify the contact surface, subsurface, or basic structure 
which can be impacted 
8. To strengthen the structure which might be damaged by the 
energy transfer 
9. To move rapidly in detection and evaluation of damage and to 
counter its continuation and extension 
10. All those measures which fall between the emergency period 
following the damaging energy exchange and the final 
stabilization of the process 
Table 1. Haddon’s countermeasure strategies (Haddon, 1973). 
 
According to Haddon the sequence of the countermeasure strategies is logical. 
Presumably, this refers to the fact that the strategies are ordered according to the 
downstream energy flow path from the source to the target. A successful application of a 
countermeasure arrests the energy flow. Interestingly, Haddon argues that there is no 
logical reason why the rank order of loss-reduction countermeasures generally considered 
must parallel the sequence, or rank order, of causes contributing to the result of damaged 
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people or property. As an example Haddon mentions the possibility of eliminating the 
damage of teacups by packaging them properly (the sixth strategy) even though they are 
placed in motion in the hands of the postal service.  
 
Haddon mentions a single heuristics: The larger the amounts of energy involved in 
relation to the resistance to damage of structures at risk, the earlier the strategy must lie in 
the countermeasure sequence. 
 
 
A model-based approach to countermeasures  
 
Haddon has demonstrated that experiences of countermeasures across different domains 
can be generalized on the basis of an energy transfer model of unwanted phenomena. 
 
A model of the unwanted phenomena is fundamental in order to specify different types of 
countermeasures. Furthermore, it enables a rigorous application of countermeasures, 
which facilitates a certain level of reproducibility. Nevertheless, approaches to 
countermeasure/barrier analysis that lack a model of the underlying mechanism of the 
unwanted phenomena are still quite common. Typically, such approaches define a 
countermeasure/barrier as something that hinders one event from causing another (see 
e.g. (Svenson (1991)).  
 
Perceiving causality as a relation between events is a heritage from Hume’s regularity 
theory of causality (Hume, 2000). This theory denies the common idea that causal action, 
by which an active cause produces an effect, can be experienced. So the causal relation 
reflects no more than a cause as experienced and an effect as experienced, and the fact of 
their co-appearance (regularity). The fact that we experience causal production is judged 
by Hume to be illusory and have a psychological explanation.  
 
Based on an event view of causation it is not possible to discriminate systematically 
between different kinds of countermeasures. Furthermore, the specification of 
countermeasures/barriers will depend on the identification of events, which is typically 
strongly subjective (Rasmussen, 1991).  
 
 
Formalizing Haddon’s countermeasure strategies 
 
By substituting the underlying energy transfer model with a model of causation this 
section describes a formalization of Haddon’s countermeasure strategies described in 
Table 1. Other authors have attempted to formalize countermeasure strategies. For 
instance, Kingston (2002) has suggested to generalize the energy transfer model (the 
model on which the MORT barrier analysis is founded) in order to extend the field of 
application of the MORT program. The problem is that, in some domains, the energy 
approach requires too much forcing (Kingston et al., 2004). By means of a model based 
on the concept of agency Kingston (2002) proposed a generalization of the energy 
transfer model behind the barrier analysis in the MORT program. The model proposed in 
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this report also incorporates the notion of agency, but originates mainly from a realist 
approach to causation described by Harré and Madden (1975). This model provides an 
alternative to the regularity theory of causality and gives primacy to causal action and the 
participating entities. Events only have a secondary role to play in this model. 
 
 
A model of causation 
 
Instead of perceiving causality as a relation among events the present model describes 
causality in terms of a process of power-actualization. That is, the focus is not on events 
but on the underlying entities that interact when their powers (and liabilities) are 
actualized.  
 
The model makes a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic determinants of causal 
action. The intrinsic determinants refer to the entities having powers, which they possess 
in virtue of their intrinsic natures (Harré and Madden, 1975). Powers represent 
potentialities for causal action that are actualized when appropriate conditions are in 
place. In the present model events are reduced to extrinsic determinants. That is, events 
can be identified as having a role in the power-actualization only if they can be shown to 
trigger the action of a powerful entity.  
 
The notion of power is inherently active and reflects the property of an entity (a causal 
agent) with the potentiality to produce a change or alteration in some other entity. The 
notion of liability is the passive counterpart of power and reflects the property of an 
entity (a patient) with the potentiality to undergo a change or alteration under the 
influence of some other entity. Because the same entity can have powers as well as 
liabilities it can have different roles in relation to causal action. 
 
As opposed to an intelligent agent a causal agent has no decision-making capabilities. A 
causal agent is an entity with the power to perform some action that is not intentional, at 
least from the part of the causal agent. The relationship between causal action and the 
powerful entities participating in action is illustrated in Figure 1. The entity X has an 
agent role whereas Y has a patient role in the causal action. 
 
Ag
en
t Patient
X Y
Action
 
Figure 1. The structure of causal action. 
 
This account of causation is similar in structure to the linguistic account of the semantic 
deep structure of a sentence. According to the theory of semantic deep structure in 
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linguistics, introduced by Fillmore (1968), the semantic content of a sentence S can be 
represented as a proposition P, specified in terms of relationships between a verb V and 
the other constituents of the sentence (typically noun phrases). The main point is that 
such relationships can be covered by a limited number of fixed cases or semantic roles, 
such as agent, object, instrument, etc. A predicate (the verb) and set of arguments (the 
semantic roles) define the propositions used to represent the semantic deep structure of a 
sentence. For instance, the following two sentences: 1) “John opened the door with a 
key” and 2) “John used a key to open the door” have the same semantic deep structure 
which can be represented by the proposition:  (open (Agent John) (Object door) 
(Instrument key)). 
 
The similarity between the causal model and the linguistic account of natural language 
semantics means that AI modeling schemes such as semantic nets (Brachman, 1979) and 
conceptual graphs (Sowa, 1984) can be used as tools for representations based on the 
causal model described above.  
 
In the remaining part of the report the structure of action, defined by the roles describing 
the relationship between an action and its participating entities, is also referred to as the 
semantic structure of action.   
 
 
Action Possibilities 
 
An action is actualized when the powers and liabilities of the entities participating in the 
action are actualized. A precondition for actuality is that the action is possible in the first 
place. In turn, action possibility depends on potentiality and opportunity for action. 
 
The action potentiality is determined by the powers and liabilities of the entities (as 
described above). An action is potential when the causal agent has the power to do A and 
the patient has the liability to undergo A. The action opportunity exists when the spatio-
temporal settings allow the agent to act on the patient (Lind, 2000). In other words, the 
patient should be in the “reach” of the agent. Apart from the action possibility, the 
actualization of an action typically requires certain triggering conditions. Consequently, 
the above can be summarized roughly by the following sentence:  
 
Potentiality & Opportunity & Triggering conditions = Actuality 
 
Potentiality represents intrinsic determinants of causal action while opportunity and 
triggering conditions represent extrinsic determinants. Below a more detailed description 
is given. See also Figure 2. 
 
An action A is possible only if:  
1) The agent and the patient have the potentiality to enter into action. 
a. There is an agent with the power to do A,  
b. A patient with the liability to undergo A, and  
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2) The agent and the patient have the opportunity to take part in the action A (the 
agent can ‘reach’ the patient). 
 
An action A is actualized only if: 
1) Action A is possible,  
2) The power of the agent to do A is actualized by triggering conditions and 
3) The action A is not counteracted. 
 
Possibility Actuality
Potentiality Opportunity
Power Liability
The agent has
the power to do
A
The patient has
the liability to
undergo A
The agent can ”
reach” the
patient
The agent does
A
The patient
undergoes A
Actualization
Triggering
condition are
satisfied  
Figure 2. Overview of the determinants of causal action. 
 
 
Using the model of causation to formalize Haddon’s countermeasure strategies 
 
In the above the causal determinants (intrinsic and extrinsic) were defined for causal 
actions in general. By means of adopting a negative perspective on the determinants of an 
unwanted action it is possible to derive a formalized account of countermeasure types, i.e. 
the ways in which an unwanted causal action can be opposed (i.e. prevented or 
mitigated). Note that we are referring to two types of action here: 1) an action that is 
unwanted, and 2) an action which is supposed to counteract the unwanted action. Figure 3 
illustrates the means-end relationship between the two action types (A and B). More 
specifically, action B is a means of counteracting action A and we refer to Action B as a 
countermeasure. 
Age
nt
Patient
Action A
Action B
C
ou
nt
er
ac
t
Unwanted Action
Countermeasure
 
Figure 3. Means-end relation between an unwanted action A and a countermeasure B. 
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  Formalized  Countermeasure Types 
Haddon’s Countermeasure 
Strategies 
To inhibit 
action 
potentiality  
1. To inhibit the power of the agent 
 
 
2. To reduce the power of the agent 
 
 
3. To reduce the liability of the 
patient 
1. To prevent the initial marshalling 
of the form of energy 
 
2. To reduce the amount of energy 
marshalled 
 
8. To strengthen the structure which 
might be damaged by the energy 
transfer 
To inhibit 
action 
possibility 
To 
eliminate 
and reduce 
action 
opportunity  
4. To eliminate the opportunity for 
power- actualization (action) by 
separating the agent and the patient 
in space and time 
 
5. To eliminate the opportunity for 
power-actualization (action) by 
separating the agent and the patient 
by interposition of a material barrier 
 
6. To reduce the opportunity for 
power-actualization (action) by 
modifying the contact surface, 
subsurface, or basic structure which 
can be impacted 
5. To separate in space or time the 
energy being released from the 
susceptible structure 
 
 
6. To separate the energy being 
released from the susceptible 
structure by interposition of a 
material barrier 
 
7. To modify the contact surface, 
subsurface, or basic structure which 
can be impacted 
To prevent power-
actualization 
7. To prevent triggering conditions 
for power-actualization 
3. To prevent the release of the 
energy 
To control the 
actualized action 
8. To modify power-actualization 
 
 
 
9. To control the state alterations 
(damage) of the patient 
 
 
10. To stabilize and repair the state 
alterations (damage) of the patient 
4. To modify the rate of spatial 
distribution of release of energy from 
its source 
 
9. To move rapidly in detection and 
evaluation of damage and to counter 
its continuation and extension 
 
10. All those measures which fall 
between the emergency period 
following the damaging energy 
exchange and the final stabilization 
of the process 
Table 2. Formalized description of countermeasures. 
 
The formalized countermeasure types (corresponding to a classification of Action B in 
Figure 3) are described in the third column of Table 2. The countermeasure types are 
derived by adopting a negative view on causal action - eliminating, inhibiting and 
reducing its determinants shown in Figure 2, i.e. inhibiting action possibility, preventing 
actualization, controlling the action. Note that the sequence of countermeasures is 
different from the sequence of Haddon’s original countermeasure strategies formulated 
on the basis of an energy transfer model (shown in the fourth column of Table 2). The 
numbers in column four indicate the original sequence. Preliminary results of the 
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translation between the two approaches, based on two different kinds of models, are 
described in (Lind and Petersen, 2003).  
 
 
A Critical Analysis of Barriers  
 
The term “barrier” is widely used for analysis and assessment in in safety critical 
domains such as nuclear power plants. Despite its widespread use the term “barrier” is 
somewhat problematic and in the safety literature its specific meaning lacks consensus.  
 
Below some of the problems associated with the use of the term “barrier” in a safety 
context are outlined. In order to clarify the term “barrier” a more precise terminology is 
proposed, based on an analysis of the semantic structure of countermeasures. In this 
analysis the model of causation described above has an important role to play. 
 
 
The metaphorical misuse of the barrier concept 
 
An important source of confusion is that the term “barrier” is used (or rather misused) 
metaphorically to denote things such as procedures and training that differ significantly 
from the original “material object” meaning of the term “barrier”. To understand these 
target objects as material objects is confusing and might lead to incorrect inferences. 
 
Following Cognitive Semantics there is reason to believe that the barrier concept is 
grounded in our bodily experience of the physical world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
That is, the original meaning of the term “barrier” is most likely a material object that 
hinders physical motion through its location. Walls and fences are prototypical examples 
of barriers in this sense. 
 
An early definition of the term “barrier” in a safety context is found in Haddon’s work on 
countermeasure (described above). Haddon’s sixth countermeasure strategy refers to the 
interposition of a “material barrier” as a way of separating the released energy and the 
susceptible structure (see Table 1). This specific meaning of the term “barrier” is close to 
its original “material object” meaning. Instead of hindering physical motion, the barrier 
hinders the flow of energy through its location. 
 
It is important to note that the remaining nine countermeasure strategies are not realized 
by material barriers that separate the released energy from the susceptible structures. In 
fact, this is what distinguishes them from the sixth countermeasure strategy. The 
remaining countermeasure strategies refer to an entire range of different kinds of 
participating entities that are often referred to as “barriers” in the literature.  
 
Using physically grounded concepts to describe abstract things is a common 
characteristic of everyday language. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) the 
metaphorical use of embodied concepts reflects a basic human condition for making 
sense and thinking about abstract things/concepts. However, in cases where the original 
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meaning of a source concept provides a vague or even incorrect description of the target, 
metaphorical use of the source concept becomes problematic or even unacceptable. This 
is precisely why it is confusing the term barrier for things such as control systems, 
training and procedures.  
 
Hollnagel’s classification of different types of barrier systems includes barriers based on 
signs, so-called symbolic or immaterial barriers (Hollnagel, 1999). For instance, 
procedures can be perceived as symbolic barriers. Although Hollnagel is careful when 
defining these barrier types, including their dependency on the capability of intelligent 
agents to interpret signs, the metaphorical use of the term “barrier” remains a potential 
source of confusion. This is confirmed by Hale et al.’s comments on Hollnagel’s 
extended barrier concept: 
 
“...the behaviour which should be carried out and the circumstances under which that 
must take place; this is often defined in a written rule or procedure, but can be devised by 
an individual or group on the spot to meet unexpected circumstances: Hollnagel identifies 
these rule or procedures as ‘immaterial barriers’, but we see them only as elements in a 
total barrier function, since on their own they achieve nothing.” Hale et al. (2004, p. 611).  
 
Apart from the problems caused by the metaphorical misuse of the term “barrier”, also 
the ontological status of “barrier” is ambiguous in the literature. For instance the MORT 
program refers to Haddon’s countermeasure strategies as “barriers” (Johnson, 1973). As a 
result it is not always clear whether “barrier” is used to denote an action, an entity, or 
both.  
 
Several attempts have been made to clarify the term “barrier”. For instance, Svenson 
(1991) makes a distinction between so-called barrier functions (what is done to arrest the 
accident evolution) and barrier systems (things that maintain the barrier function). 
According to Svenson, barrier systems may be things such as an operator, an instruction, 
a physical separation, and an emergency control system. The means-end view on 
countermeasures adopted in this report, distinguishing between the countermeasure action 
and the participating entities, is similar to Svenson’s distinction between functions and 
systems. In addition, however, the model of causation provides a systematic account of 
the relationship between countermeasures and the participating entities.  
 
 
Towards a more precise terminology  
 
Obviously it is not acceptable to have a vague conceptual basis for accident analysis and 
modeling of safety critical systems. The solution is not, however, to focus only on 
countermeasure performed by material objects. Although this would enable a well-
defined use of the term “barrier”, it fails to acknowledge other important types of 
countermeasures that go beyond those performed by (passive) material objects.  
 
In order to clarify the term “barrier” an alternative terminology is proposed, based on an 
analysis of the causal structure of countermeasures prescribed by the model of causation 
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described above. The model of causation gives primacy to the entities participating in 
action. These entities have well-defined roles such as e.g. agent and patient.  
 
By means of applying the causal model at the level of countermeasure the relationship 
between countermeasures and the participating entities can be systematized. More 
specifically, the model can be used to make explicit the role of the entities participating in 
countermeasures. For instance, the agent refers to an entity with the power to perform the 
countermeasure. In the remaining part of the report the agent of the countermeasure is 
referred to as a countermeasure agent (see Figure 4). 
 
Age
nt
Patient
Action A
Cou
nter
m.
Age
nt
Counterm.Patient
Action B
C
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t
Unwanted Action
Countermeasure
 
Figure 4. The means-end relation between an unwanted action and a countermeasure.  
 
As opposed to the unwanted action (Action A), a countermeasure (Action B) is an 
intentional action performed to obtain a certain purpose, namely to oppose Action A. In 
the following advantage is taken of the fact that intentional actions have the same causal 
structure as simple physical actions. 
 
It is proposed that the agent role of countermeasures can be used as a generalized 
“barrier” concept, covering the entire range of different entities with the power to 
perform a countermeasure. Apart from the fact that “countermeasure agent” is more 
general than the term “barrier” it does not have the drawbacks of the term “barrier” 
mentioned above. This means that the term “barrier” is restricted to denote material 
objects. Mentioned in passing the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has adopted a 
similar restricted view on the term “barrier” (SKI, 1998).  
 
Although the concept of countermeasure agent solves some of the problems associated 
with the term “barrier” the present model of causation cannot account for the role that 
things such as procedures have in relation to countermeasures. It certainly does not make 
sense to model procedures as a countermeasure agent. After all it is not the procedure 
itself that is performing the countermeasure. A procedure is a sign (denoting something 
other then itself) that requires an intelligent agent with the capability of interpreting signs, 
in order to work (Hollnagel, 1999).  
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The role of signs cannot be accounted for by the current model of causation (or for that 
matter by Haddon’s energy transfer model) because the agent is purely physical and 
incapable of interpreting signs. Clearly this is a limitation when we want to discuss the 
role of sign-based countermeasure in relation to the actions performed by intelligent 
agents, such as humans. In order to extend the analysis of countermeasures to include 
sign-based countermeasures, the causal model needs to be revised.  
 
 
An extended view on countermeasures  
 
The model of causation proposed above focuses on entities with the power and liability to 
take part in action. It is argued that an action can be opposed by 1) inhibiting action 
possibilities, 2) preventing the actualization of the action, or by 3) controlling the action 
once it is actualized. Under these headings a set of generic countermeasures where 
proposed (see Table 2). 
 
In the following an attempt is made to widen the view on countermeasure to include also 
sign-based countermeasure, i.e. countermeasures performed as communicative actions. In 
order enable this a revised model of the unwanted phenomena, where an intelligent agent 
substitutes the causal agent, is proposed.  
 
Just like a causal agent, an intelligent agent has the power to perform certain action in 
specific circumstances. However, when it comes to power-actualization there are 
fundamental differences between the two models. For instance, it is no longer correct to 
state that the power is actualized by specific extrinsic triggering condition. As opposed to 
a causal agent an intelligent agent has the capacity to make decisions. That is, the agent 
observes and interprets signs in its environment and depending on its preferences and 
goal(s) it chooses to act in a specific way (inside the envelope of possible actions).  
 
The agent’s competence is an additional intrinsic determinant of action. In order for the 
action to be possible it is not enough that the agent has the power to (physically) perform 
the action. In addition the agent typically needs to have a certain level of competence to 
perform the action. The revised model can be roughly described by the following 
sentence:  
 
Competence & Potentiality & Opportunity & Decision = Actuality 
 
Since the decision process depends on the agent’s interpretation of signs it is possible, to 
some extent, to influence the decisions and hence the actions of the agent by shaping its 
environment. In order to account for the different ways in which the decision process can 
be influenced it is necessary to focus on signs and sign production. 
 
The new type of countermeasures that emerges will have to be determined on the basis of 
an analysis of the role of signs and communicative action and how they can influence the 
actions of an agent (the interpreter). 
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Hollnagel (1999) has already argued that signs have a role to play in relation to 
countermeasures and facilitators. His notion of symbolic barrier refers to things that, by 
means of signifying something, can influence the actions of an intelligent agent (the 
interpreter). For instance, Hollnagel perceives a procedure as a symbolic barrier because 
it has the function to prescribe action. To prescribe is, however, not the only way a sign 
can influence an agent’s action. 
 
A comprehensive account of the different kinds of sign-based countermeasures should be 
based on the different ways in which the action of the intelligent agent (the interpreter) 
can, in principle, be counteracted by signs. For this purpose we will use Charles Morris’ 
analysis of signs. His analysis of signs is developed from a behavioral perspective and he 
argues that signs have different modes of signifying, representing different ways of 
influencing the action/behavior of the interpreter. This corresponds to a so-called 
pragmatic view on signs (Morris, 1938).  
 
 
A pragmatic view on signs 
 
According to Morris (1946), a sign can be either designative (signifying characteristics of 
stimulus properties of objects), appriasive (signifying preferred objects or situations) or 
prescriptive (signifying required responses). This distinction between three modes of 
signifying is based on Mead’s theory of action (Mead, 1938). 
 
 
The different modes of signifying represent different ways in which the action/behavior 
of agents, that are capable of interpreting signs, can be influenced by signs.  
 
A designative sign (a designator) signifies to the interpreter the characteristics 
(discriminata) of the situation (current and future). A designator does not signify the 
import of this object for its goals or what response is required toward the object in order 
to reach its goals. A designator influences what the agent knows about the current 
situations and its future developments. The agent makes judgments about the (possible) 
discrepancy between the current situation and the desired situation (according to his or 
her goals). If there is a discrepancy between the current situation and the desired situation 
there is a need to act in order to change the current situation. If there is no discrepancy 
the agent omits to act. Indirectly the designators influence this evaluation process since 
only what is known about the current and future situation can be compared to what is 
desired.  
 
An appraisive sign (an appraisor) signifies to the interpreter a preferential status of an 
object in his or her behavior. In other words, it determines which objects rather than 
others the interpreter is disposed to favor in its behavior (his or her preferences). Hereby, 
the decision process is influenced. 
 
A prescriptive sign (a prescriptor) signifies the required performance of a specific 
response to some situation. They are signs since they are substitutes in the control of 
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behavior for the control some situation would exercise if it were present. A prescriptive 
sign may influence the action of the agent if there is a discrepancy between the prescribed 
action and action intended by the agent.    
 
 
Means and ends of communicative actions 
 
Apart from the possible modes of signification of signs, i.e. the different ways in which 
the interpreter in relation to his or her activity may interpret the sign, also the sign-
production aspect needs to be discussed. 
 
In order to obtain an instrumental understanding of how the behavior of an intelligent 
agent can be influenced it is important to perceive sign-production as an intentional act 
performed with a certain purpose, namely to influence the behavior of some intelligent 
agent in a specific way.  
 
Speech act theory makes a distinction between different levels of action performed by the 
sign producer, corresponding to nested intentions of the sign producer. Austin (1962) 
identifies three distinct levels of action.  
 
Locution: the act of saying something (meaning) 
Illocution: what one does in saying it (illocutionary force) 
Perlocution: what one does by saying it (achieving an effect).   
 
Searle’s (1969) notion of illocutionary force (assertive, directive, etc.) is similar to the 
different modes of signifying proposed by Morris. However, in opposition to Morris the 
illocutionary force of a sign refers to the intention of the sign producer and not the actual 
interpretation of the interpreter. In the remaining part of the report we use actually 
Morris’ modes of signifying (designation, appraising and prescription) to describe 
illocutionary force. 
 
Illocutionary acts can be described as <i,p> where i is the illocutionary force and p is the 
propositional content. 
 
Since in most cases the primary intention is to bring about a perlocutionary effect, the 
illocution and the locution should be considered as (successive) means for this end. If, for 
example, a sign producer says “Shut the window” (locution) intending for the interpreter 
to understand this utterance as an order (illocution) and further intending that the 
interpreter should shut the window (perlocution). 
 
The means-end structure of speech acts is shown in Figure 5. The perlocution is a causal  
action and its semantic structure can be accounted for by the causal model described in 
the previous section (by agent and a patient roles). The semantic structure of the 
illocution and the locution are different, however. The semantics of the locution is 
described by two roles; a sign producer and the product, i.e. the utterance produced, 
whereas two roles; sign and interpreter describe the semantics of the illocution. Since the 
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primary purpose of the entity having a sign role is to mediate a message with a specific 
propositional content and illocutionary force it could be argued that the sign producer is 
implicit in the illocution. This is illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. The means-end levels of speech acts.  
 
Although the theory of speech acts is developed within a linguistic tradition, the theory 
covers any sort of sign usage across different media.   
 
The function of procedures, for instance, can be explained in terms of Austin’s levels of 
action. The writing the procedure corresponds to the locution, whereas the 
communication of the content of the procedure to the interpreter, typically several 
instructions, corresponds to the illocution. The perlocution is the intended effect of the 
procedure on the interpreter.  
 
If the perlocution refers to an unwanted (hypothetical) action A the illocution is perceived 
as a countermeasure with the purpose to counteract that the perlocutionary agent 
performs A. Generally, the same perlocution can be implemented by different types of 
illocutions for which the propositional content refers to A more or less directly1. Below, 
three types of illocutionary countermeasures that complement the casual countermeasures 
described in the previous section are described.  
 
                                                 
1 Consider another example where the perlocution itself is a countermeasure for another unwanted causal 
action. In this case the illocution should be perceived as a facilitator or a controlmeasure, i.e. an action with 
the intention to encouraging the interpreter to perform the countermeasure. 
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• By designating something, D it is possible to draw the attention of the agent to 
specific aspects of the situation and hereby prevent it from acting in a specific way (a 
way in which he would have acted, had D not been signified). 
• By appraising something, A it is possible to influence the preferences of the agent and 
hereby prevent it from responding in a specific way (a way in which he would have 
acted had A not been signified).  
• By prescribing something, P it is possible to prevent the agent from acting in a 
specific way (a way in which the agent would have acted had P not been signified).   
 
Example: 
Suppose that the perlocution corresponds to the action of not turning up the heat in 
the room, in which the agent is located (although it has turned cold). Below three 
different ways of bringing about the perlocution are described: 
 
1) 
Locution: p: “It is warmer in the adjacent room”  
Illocution: <designation, p> 
 
2) 
Locution: p: “It is cheaper to maintain a relatively low room temperature and wear 
much clothes to keep warm” 
Illocution: <appraising, p>  
 
3) 
Locution: p: “Do not turn up the heat” 
Illocution: <prescriptive, p> 
 
Certain conditions must be satisfied for an illocution to be successful. An illocution is 
communicatively successful only if the interpreter recognizes the sign producer’s 
illocutionary intention. This is what communication is about; anything more is more than 
just communication. Whether the illocution results in the desired perlocution depends on 
a several additional conditions. Even in cases where the interpreter understands the 
intention of the sign producer the perlocution does not necessarily follow. This is 
illustrated by means of the example above where the three cases indicate different levels 
of strengths between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary level of action.  
 
In the third case there is straight forward relationship between the locution (“Do not turn 
up the heat”), the act of prescribing not to turn up the heat (the illocution) and the desired 
effect in the agent’s behavior, i.e. “not to turn up the heat” (the perlocution). In the first 
case there is also a straight forward relationship between the locution (“It is warmer in 
the adjacent room”) and the act of asserting that it is warmer in the adjacent room) (the 
illocution). Less direct is the connection between the locution and the desired effect with 
respect to the agent’s behavior. Clearly there is no linguistic connection here for the signs 
does not mention turning up the heat. The indirect connection is inferential. The 
interpreter must infer what the sign-producer intends.  
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Actually this stresses the means-end levels of action referred to here. The perlocution 
reflects the (primary) intention with which the sign-producer is producing the sign. 
Whether the perlocution is actually performed is a matter of context that the sign-
producer relies on the sign-user to rely on. This is true independent of the level of 
directness of the relation between the action levels. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This report has addressed a number of theoretical issues related to Haddon’s 
countermeasure strategies.  
• Based on a model of causation that generalizes Haddon’s energy transfer model a 
formalization of Haddon’s countermeasure strategies has been proposed. The 
formalized set of countermeasures has been derived by adopting a negative 
perspective on the determinants of causal action.  
• Some of the problems associated with the term “barrier” have been outlined and 
an attempt has been made to clarify the use of the term based on the causal 
structure of countermeasures, i.e. the relationship between a specific 
countermeasure action and the participating entities. 
• The scope of countermeasures was extended from physical actions to 
communicative actions, i.e. actions based on signs produced in order to influence 
the action of the agent interpreting them. Based on a discussion of the means-end 
levels of communicative action, using Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962), a set of 
sign-based countermeasure types, complementing the causal countermeasure 
types, has been proposed. 
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